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Abstract
We consider peer review in a conference setting where there is typically an overlap between the set
of reviewers and the set of authors. This overlap can incentivize strategic reviews to influence the final
ranking of one’s own papers. In this work, we address this problem through the lens of social choice,
and present a theoretical framework for strategyproof and efficient peer review. We first present and
analyze an algorithm for reviewer-assignment and aggregation that guarantees strategyproofness and a
natural efficiency property called unanimity, when the authorship graph satisfies a simple property. Our
algorithm is based on the so-called partitioning method, and can be thought as a generalization of this
method to conference peer review settings. We then empirically show that the requisite property on the
authorship graph is indeed satisfied in the ICLR-17 submission data, and further demonstrate a simple
trick to make the partitioning method more practically appealing for conference peer review. Finally, we
complement our positive results with negative theoretical results where we prove that under various ways
of strengthening the requirements, it is impossible for any algorithm to be strategyproof and efficient.
1 Introduction
Peer review serves as an effective solution for quality evaluation in reviewing processes, especially in academic
paper review (Dörfler et al., 2017; Shah et al., 2017) and massive open online courses (MOOCs) (Díez Peláez et al.,
2013; Piech et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2013). However, despite its scalability, competitive peer review faces the
serious challenge of being vulnerable to strategic manipulations (Anderson et al., 2007; Thurner and Hanel,
2011; Alon et al., 2011; Kurokawa et al., 2015; Kahng et al., 2017). By giving lower scores to competitive
submissions, reviewers may be able to increase the chance that their own submissions get accepted. For in-
stance, a recent experimental study (Balietti et al., 2016) on peer review of art, published in the Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences (USA), concludes
“...competition incentivizes reviewers to behave strategically, which reduces the fairness of evalu-
ations and the consensus among referees.”
As noted by Thurner and Hanel (2011), even a small number of selfish, strategic reviewers can drastically
reduce the quality of scientific standard. In the context of conference peer review, Langford (2008) calls
academia inherently adversarial:
“It explains why your paper was rejected based on poor logic. The reviewer wasn’t concerned with
research quality, but rather with rejecting a competitor.”
Langford states that a number of people agree with this viewpoint. Thus the importance of peer review in
academia and its considerable influence over the careers of researchers significantly underscores the need to
design peer review systems that are insulated from strategic manipulations.
In this work, we present a higher-level framework to address the problem of strategic behavior in con-
ference peer review. We present an informal description of the framework here and formalize it later in
∗Equal contribution.
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the paper. The problem setting comprises a number of submitted papers and a number of reviewers. We
are given a graph which we term as the “conflict graph”. The conflict graph is a bipartite graph with the
reviewers and papers as the two partitions of vertices, and an edge between any reviewer and paper if that
reviewer has a conflict with that paper. Conflicts may arise due to authorship (the reviewer is an author
of the paper) or other reasons such as institutional conflicts etc. Given this conflict graph, there are two
design steps in the peer review procedure: (i) assigning each paper to a subset of reviewers for review, and
(ii) aggregating the reviews provided by the reviewers to give a final evaluation of each paper. Under our
framework, the goal is to design these two steps of the peer-review procedure that satisfies two properties –
strategyproofness and efficiency.
The first goal is to design peer-review procedures that are strategyproof with respect to the given conflict
graph. A peer-review procedure is said to be strategyproof if no reviewer can change the outcome for any
papers with which she/he has a conflict. This definition is formalized later in the paper. Strategyproofness
not only reassures the authors that the review process is fair, but also ensures that the authors receive
proper feedback for their work. We note that a strategyproof peer-review procedure alone is inadequate with
respect to any practical requirements – simply giving out a fixed, arbitrary evaluation makes the peer-review
procedure strategyproof.
Consequently, in addition to requiring strategyproofness, our framework measures the peer-review pro-
cedure with another yardstick – that of efficiency. Informally, the efficiency of a peer-review procedure is a
measurement of how well the final outcome reflects reviewers’ assessments of the quality of the submissions,
or a measurement of the accuracy in terms of the final acceptance decisions. There are several ways to
define efficiency – from a social choice perspective or a statistical perspective. In this paper, we consider
efficiency in terms of the notion of unanimity in social choice theory: an agreement among all reviewers must
be reflected in the final aggregation.
In addition to the conceptual contribution based on this framework, we make several technical contribu-
tions towards this important problem. We first design a peer review algorithm which theoretically guarantees
strategyproofness along with a notion of efficiency that we term “group unanimity”. Our result requires only
a mild assumption on the conflict graph of the peer-review design task. We show this assumption indeed
holds true in practice via an empirical analysis of the submissions made to the 2017 International Conference
on Learning Representations (ICLR-17) conference1. Our algorithm is based on the popular partitioning
method, and our positive results can be regarded as generalizing it to the setting of conference peer re-
view. We further demonstrate a simple trick to make the partitioning method more practically appealing
for conference peer review and validate it on the ICLR-17 data.
We then complement our positive results with negative results showing that one cannot expect to meet
requirements that are much stronger than that provided by our algorithm. In particular, we show that
under mild assumptions on the authorships, there is no algorithm that can be both strategyproof and
“pairwise unanimous”. Pairwise unanimity is a stronger notion of efficiency than group unanimity, and
is also known as Pareto efficiency in the literature of social choice (Brandt et al., 2016). We show that
our negative result continues to hold even when the notion of strategyproofness is made extremely weak.
We then provide a conjecture and insightful results on the impossibility when the assignment satisfies a
simple “connectivity” condition. Finally, we connect back to the traditional settings in social choice theory,
and show an impossibility when every reviewer reviews every paper. These negative results highlight the
intrinsic hardness in designing strategyproof conference review systems.
2 Related Work
As early as in the 1970s, Gibbard and Satterthwaite had already been aware of the importance of a healthy
voting rule that is strategyproof in the setting of social choice (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). Nowa-
days, the fact that prominent peer review mechanisms such as the one used by the National Science Founda-
tion (Hazelrigg, 2013) and the one for time allocation on telescope (Merrifield and Saari, 2009) are manipu-
1https://openreview.net/group?id=ICLR.cc/2017/conference
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lable has further called for strategyproof peer review mechanisms.
Our work is most closely related to a series of works on strategyproof peer selection (De Clippel et al.,
2008; Alon et al., 2011; Holzman and Moulin, 2013; Fischer and Klimm, 2015; Kurokawa et al., 2015; Aziz et al.,
2016; Kahng et al., 2017), where agents cannot benefit from misreporting their preferences over other agents.2
De Clippel et al. (2008) consider strategyproof decision making under the setting where a divisible resource is
shared among a set of agents. Later, Alon et al. (2011); Holzman and Moulin (2013) consider strategyproof
peer approval voting where each agent nominates a subset of agents and the goal is to select one agent with
large approvals. Alon et al. (2011) propose a randomized strategyproof mechanism using partitioning that
achieves provable approximate guarantee to the deterministic but non-strategyproof mechanism that simply
selects the agent with maximum approvals. Bousquet et al. (2014) and Fischer and Klimm (2015) further
extended and analyzed this mechanism to provide an optimal approximate ratio in expectation. Although
the first partitioning-based mechanism partitions all the voters into two disjoint subsets, this has been re-
cently extended to k-partition by Kahng et al. (2017). In all these works, each agent is essentially required
to evaluate all the other agents except herself. This is impractical for conference peer review, where each
reviewer only has limited time and energy to review a small subset of submissions. In light of such con-
straints, Kurokawa et al. (2015) propose an impartial mechanism (Credible Subset) and provide associated
approximation guarantees for a setting in which each agent is only required to review a few other agents.
Credible Subset is a randomized mechanism that outputs a subset of k agents, but it has non-zero probability
returns an empty set. Based on the work of De Clippel et al. (2008); Aziz et al. (2016) propose a mechanism
for peer selection, termed as Dollar Partition, which is strategyproof and satisfies a natural monotonicity
property. Empirically the authors showed that Dollar Partition outperforms Credible Subset consistently and
in the worst case is better than partition-based approach. However, even if the target output size is k, Dollar
Partition may return a subset of size strictly larger than k. Our positive results, specifically our Divide-and-
Rank algorithm presented subsequently, borrows heavily from this line of literature. That said, our work
addresses the application of conference peer review which is significantly more general and challenging as
compared to the settings considered in past works.
Our setting of conference peer review is more challenging as compared to these past works as each reviewer
may author multiple papers and moreover each paper may have multiple authors as reviewers. Specifically,
the conflict graph under conference peer review is a general bipartite graph, where conflicts between reviewers
and papers can arise not only because of authorships, but also advisor-advisee relationships, institutional
conflicts, etc. In contrast, past works focus on applications of peer-grading and grant proposal review, and
hence consider only one-to-one conflict graphs (that is, where every reviewer is conflicted with exactly one
paper).
Apart from the most important difference mentioned above, there are a couple of other differences of
this work as compared to some past works. In this paper we focus on ordinal preferences where each
reviewer is asked to give a total ranking of the assigned papers, as opposed to providing numeric ratings.
We do so inspired by past literature (Barnett, 2003; Stewart et al., 2005; Douceur, 2009; Tsukida and Gupta,
2011; Shah et al., 2013, 2016) which highlights the benefits of ordinal data in terms of avoiding biases and
miscalibrations as well as allowing for a more direct comparison between papers. Secondly, while most
previous mechanisms either output a single paper or a subset of papers, we require our mechanism to output
a total ranking over all papers. We consider this requirement since this automated output in practice will be
used by the program chairs as a guideline to make their decisions, and this more nuanced data comprising
the ranking of the papers can be more useful towards this goal.
A number of other papers study various other aspects of conference peer review. The works Hartvigsen et al.
(1999); Charlin and Zemel (2013); Garg et al. (2010); Stelmakh et al. (2018) design algorithms for assigning
reviewers to papers under various objectives, and these objectives and algorithms may in fact be used as
alternative definitions of the objective of “efficiency” studied in the present paper. The papers Roos et al.
(2011); Ge et al. (2013); Wang and Shah (2018) consider review settings where reviewers provide scores to
2Some past literature refers to this requirement as ensuring that agents are “impartial”. However, the term “impartial” also
has connotations on (possibly implicit) biases due to extraneous factors such as some features about the agents (Hojat et al.,
2003). In this paper, we deliberately use the term “strategyproof” in order to make the scope of our contribution clear in that
we do not address implicit biases.
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each paper, with the aim of addressing the problems of biases and miscalibrations in these scores. Finally, ex-
periments and empirical evaluations of conference peer reviews can be found in Lawrence and Cortes (2014);
Mathieus (2008); Connolly et al. (2014); Shah et al. (2017); Tomkins et al. (2017).
3 Problem setting
In this section, we first give a brief introduction to the setting of our problem, and then introduce the
notation used in the paper. At last, we formally define various concepts and properties to be discussed in
the subsequent sections.
Modern review process is governed by four key steps: (i) a number of papers are submitted for review;
(ii) each paper is assigned to a number of reviewers; (iii) reviewers provide their feedback on the papers they
are reviewing; and (iv) the feedback from all reviewers is aggregated to make final decisions on the papers.
Let m be the number of reviewers and n be the number of submitted papers. Define R :“ tr1, . . . , rmu to
be the set of m reviewers and P :“ tp1, . . . , pnu to be the set of n submitted papers.
The review process must deal with a number of conflicts of interest. The most common form of conflict is
the authorship conflict: a large number of reviewers are also authors of submitted papers. Additional sources
of conflicts may include advisor-advisee relationships between reviewers and authors of papers, institutional
conflicts, etc. To characterize conflicts of interest, we use a bipartite graph C with vertices pR,Pq, where an
edge is connected between a reviewer r and a paper p if there exists some conflict of interests between reviewer
r and paper p. In this graph we omit the authors of papers who are not reviewers. Reviewers who do not have
conflicts of interest with any paper are nodes with no edges. Given the set of submitted papers and reviewers,
this graph is fixed and cannot be controlled. Note that the conflict graph C defined above can be viewed
as a generalization of the authorship graph in the previously-studied settings (Merrifield and Saari, 2009;
Alon et al., 2011; Holzman and Moulin, 2013; Fischer and Klimm, 2015; Kurokawa et al., 2015; Aziz et al.,
2016; Kahng et al., 2017) of peer grading and grant proposal review, where each reviewer (paper) is connected
to at most one paper (reviewer).
The review process is modeled by a second bipartite graph G, termed as review graph, that also has the
reviewers and papers pR,Pq as its vertices. This review graph has an edge between a reviewer and a paper
if that reviewer reviews that paper. For every reviewer ri pi P rmsq,3 we let Pi Ď P denote the set of papers
assigned to this reviewer for review, or in other words, the neighborhood of node ri in the bipartite graph G.
The program chairs of the conference are free to choose this graph, but subject to certain constraints and
preferences. To ensure balanced workloads across reviewers, we require that every reviewer is assigned at
most µ papers for some integers 1 ď µ ď n. In other words, every node in R has at most µ neighbors (in P)
in graph G. Additionally, each paper must be reviewed by a certain minimum number of reviewers, and we
denote this minimum number as λ. Thus every node in the set P must have at least λ neighbors (in R) in
the graph G. For any (directed or undirected) graph H, we let the notation EH denote the set of (directed
or undirected, respectively) edges in graph H.
At the end of the reviewing period, each reviewer provides a total ranking of the papers that she/he
reviewed. For any set of papers P 1 Ď P , we let ΠpP 1q denote the set of all permutations of papers in
P 1. Furthermore, for any paper pj P P 1 and any permutation πpP 1q P ΠpP 1q, we let πjpP 1q denote the
position of paper pj in the permutation πpP 1q. At the end of the reviewing period, each reviewer ri pi P
rmsq submits a total ranking πpiqpPiq P ΠpPiq of the papers in Pi. We define a (partial) ranking profile
pi :“ pπp1qpP1q, . . . , π
pmqpPmqq as the collection of rankings from all the reviewers. When the assignment
P1, . . . ,Pm of papers to reviewers is fixed, we use the shorthand pπp1q, . . . , πpmqq for profile pi. For any subset
of papers P 1 Ď P , we let piP 1 denote the restriction of pi to only the induced rankings on P 1. Finally, when
the ranking under consideration is clear from context, we use the notation p ą p1 to say that paper p is
ranked higher than paper p1 in the ranking.
Under this framework, the goal is to jointly design: (a) a paper-reviewer assignment scheme, that is,
edges of the graph G, and (b) an associated review aggregation rule f :
śm
i“1 ΠpPiq Ñ ΠpPq which maps
3We use the standard notation rκs to represent the set t1, . . . , κu for any positive integer κ.
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from the ranking profile to an aggregate total ranking of all papers.4 For any aggregation function f , we let
fjppiq be the position of paper pj when the input to f is the profile pi.
We consider two factors for designing the review process pG, fq. The first factor is efficiency: the output
ranking should reflect opinions of most reviewers. We capture this notion of efficiency by a function Φ takes
a review graph and an aggregation rule as inputs and outputs a measure of efficiency (with higher values
indicating a higher efficiency). This function may be chosen by the program chairs of the conference; we
discuss some choices below which we use in this paper. The second factor we consider is strategyproofness :
we want to make sure that no reviewer can benefit from mis-reporting her preferences. Then the goal is to
solve the following optimization problem:
maximize
G,f
ΦpG, fq
subject to pG, fq is strategyproof with respect to C.
(1)
We denote the optimal value of (1) by OptpΦ, Cq. In what follows we define strategyproofness and efficiency
that any conference review mechanism f should satisfy under our paper-review setting. Inspired by the
theory of social choice, in this paper we define the notion of efficiency via two variants of “unanimity”, and
we also discuss two natural notions of strategyproofness. That said, we emphasize that the formulation in
(1) is a general framework that can additionally incorporate other notions of efficiency such as statistical
efficiency. For any choice of Φ under our framework, the goal is to maximize the efficiency of the review
mechanism under the constraint that it should also be strategyproof.
3.1 Efficiency (unanimity)
In this paper, we consider efficiency of a peer-review process in terms of the notion of unanimity. Unanimity
is one of the most prevalent and classic properties to measure the efficiency of a voting system in the theory
of social choice (Fishburn, 2015).
At a colloquial level, unanimity states that when there is a common agreement among all reviewers, then
the aggregation of their opinions must also respect this agreement. In this paper we discuss two kinds of
unanimity, termed group unanimity (GU) and pairwise unanimity (PU). Both kinds of unanimity impose
requirements on the aggregation function for any given reviewer assignment. Specifically, both notions of
unanimity are represented by efficiency functions which are binary and set as 1 if the respective notion of
unanimity is satisfied and 0 otherwise; we denote the efficiency function as ΦPU when considering pairwise
unanimity and as ΦGU when considering group unanimity.
We first define group unanimity:
Definition 3.1 (Group Unanimity, GU). We define pG, fq to be group unanimous (GU) if the following
condition holds for every possible profile pi. If there is a non-empty set of papers P 1 Ă P such that every
reviewer ranks the papers she reviewed from P 1 higher than those she reviewed from PzP 1, then fppiq must
have px ą py for every pair of papers px P P 1 and py P PzP 1 such that at least one reviewer has reviewed
both px and py. The efficiency objective ΦGUpG, fq “ 1 if pG, fq is group unanimous, and ΦGUpG, fq “ 0
otherwise.
Intuitively, group unanimity says that if papers can be partitioned into two sets such that every reviewer
who has reviewed papers from both sets agrees that the papers she has reviewed from the first set are better
than what she reviewed from the second set, then the final output ranking should respect this agreement.
Our second notion of unanimity, termed pairwise unanimity, is a local refinement of group unanimity.
This notion is identical to the classical notion of unanimity stated in Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow,
1950) – the classical unanimity considers every reviewer to review all papers (that is, Pi “ P ,@i P rms),
whereas our notion is also defined for settings where reviewers may review only subsets of papers.
4To be clear, the function f is tied to the assignment graph G. The graph G specifies the sets pP1, . . . ,Pmq, and then the
function f takes permutations of these sets of papers as its inputs. We omit this from the notation for brevity.
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Definition 3.2 (Pairwise Unanimity, PU). We define pG, fq to be pairwise unanimous (PU) if the following
condition holds for every possible profile pi and every pair of papers pj1 , pj2 P P : If at least one reviewer
has reviewed both pj1 and pj2 and all the reviewers that have reviewed pj1 and pj2 agree on pj1 ą pj2 , then
fj1ppiq ą fj2ppiq. The efficiency objective Φ
PUpG, fq “ 1 if pG, fq is pairwise unanimous, and ΦPUpG, fq “ 0
otherwise.
An important property is that pairwise unanimity is stronger than group unanimity:
Proposition 3.1. ΦGUpG, fq ě ΦPUpG, fq, that is, if pG, fq is pairwise unanimous, then pG, fq is also group
unanimous.
We now move on to our other requirement in peer review, that of strategyproofness.
3.2 Strategyproofness
Intuitively, strategyproofness means that a reviewer cannot benefit from being dishonest; in the context
of conference review, this means that a reviewer cannot change the position of her conflicting papers, by
changing her own ranking. Strategyproofness is defined with respect to a given conflict graph which we
denote by C; we recall the notation EC as the set of edges of graph C.
Definition 3.3 (Strategyproofness, SP). A review process pG, fq is called strategyproof with respect to
a conflict graph C if for every reviewer ri P R and paper pj P P such that pri, pjq P EC the following
condition holds: for every pair of profiles (under assignment G) that differ only in the ranking given by
reviewer ri, the position of pj is unchanged. Formally, @pi “ pπp1q, . . . , πpi´1q, πpiq, πpi`1q, . . . , πpmqq and
pi
1 “ pπp1q, . . . , πpi´1q, πpiq
1
, πpi`1q, . . . , πpmqq, it must be that fjppiq “ fjppi1q.
Having established these preliminaries, we now move on to the main results of this paper.
4 Positive results: Group unanimity and strategyproofness
In this section we consider the design of reviewer assignments and aggregation rules for strategyproofness
and group unanimity (efficiency). It is not hard to see that strategyproofness and group unanimity cannot be
simultaneously guaranteed for arbitrary conflict graphs C, for instance, when C is a fully-connected bipartite
graph. Prior works on this topic consider a specific class of conflict graphs — those with one-to-one relations
between papers and reviewers — which do not capture conference peer review settings. We consider a more
general class of conflict graphs and present an algorithm based on the partitioning-based method (Alon et al.,
2011), which we show can achieve OptpΦGU, Cq “ 1. We then empirically demonstrate, using submission
data from the ICLR-17 conference, that this class of conflict graphs is indeed representative of peer review
settings. In addition to the feasibility, we present a simple trick to significantly improve the practical appeal
of our algorithm (and more generally the partitioning method) to conference peer review.
4.1 The Divide-and-Rank Algorithm
We now present our algorithm “Divide-and-Rank” for reviewer assignment and rank aggregation. At a higher
level, our algorithm performs a partition of the reviewers and papers for assignment, and aggregates the re-
views by computing a ranking which is consistent with any group agreements. The Divide-and-Rank algorithm
works for a general conflict graph C as long as the conflict graph can be divided into two reasonably-sized
disconnected components (we verify this assumption in the next section). The algorithm is simple yet flexible
in that the assignment within each partition and the aggregation among certain groups of papers can be
done using any existing algorithm for assignment and aggregation respectively. This flexibility is useful as it
allows to further optimize various other metrics in addition to strategyproofness and unanimity.
The Divide-and-Rank assignment algorithm and Divide-and-Rank aggregation algorithm are formally pre-
sented as Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 respectively, and we discuss the details in the next two paragraphs.
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Algorithm 1 Divide-and-Rank assignment
Input: conflict graph C, parameters λ, µ, assignment algorithm A
Output: an assignment of reviewers to papers
1: pRC ,PCq, pR sC ,P sCq Ð PartitionpC, λ, µq
2: use algorithm A to assign papers P sC to reviewers RC
3: use algorithm A to assign papers PC to reviewers R sC
4: return the union of assignments from step 2 and 3
5:
6: procedure Partition(conflict graph C, parameters λ, µ)
7: run a BFS on C to get connected K components tpRk,PkquKk“1
8: let rk “ |Rk|, pk “ |Pk|, @k P rKs
9: initialize a table T r¨, ¨, ¨s P t0, 1uKˆpm`1qˆpn`1q so that T r1, r1, p1s “ T r1, 0, 0s “ 1, otherwise 0
10: for k “ 2 to K do
11: T rk, r, ps “ T rk´ 1, r, ps _ T rk ´ 1, r ´ rk, p´ pks, @0 ď r ď m, 0 ď p ď n
12: end for
13: for 0 ď r ď m, 0 ď p ď n, if there is no T rK, r, ps “ 1 such that maxt p
m´r ,
n´p
r
u ď µ
λ
, return error
14: use the standard backtracking in the table T r¨, ¨, ¨s to return pRC ,PCq and pR sC ,P sCq
15: end procedure
The Divide-and-Rank assignment algorithm begins by partitioning the conflict graph into two disconnected
components that meet the requirements specified by µ and λ. This is achieved using the subroutine Partition.
Partition first runs a breadth-first-search (BFS) algorithm to partition the original conflict graph into K
connected components, where the kth connected component contains rk ě 0 reviewers and pk ě 0 papers.
Next, the algorithm performs a dynamic programming to compute all the possible subset sums achievable by
theK connected components. Here T rk, r, ps “ 1means that there exists a partition of the first k components
such that one side of the partition has r reviewers and p papers, and 0 otherwise. The last step is to check
whether there exists a subset C satisfying the requirement, and if so, runs a standard backtracking algorithm
along the table to find the actual subset C. Clearly the Partition runs in OpKnmq, and since K ď nm, it
runs in polynomial time in the size of the input conflict graph C.
Then the algorithm assigns papers to reviewers in a fashion that guarantees each paper is going to be
reviewed by at least λ reviewers and each reviewer reviews at most µ papers. The assignment of papers
in any individual component (to reviewers in the other component) can be done using any assignment
algorithm (taken as an input A) as long as the algorithm can satisfy the pµ, λq-requirements. Possible
choices for the algorithm A include the popular Toronto paper matching system (Charlin and Zemel, 2013)
or others Hartvigsen et al. (1999); Garg et al. (2010); Stelmakh et al. (2018).
We now move to the aggregation procedure in Algorithm 2. At a high level, the papers in each component
are aggregated separately using the subroutine Contract-and-Sort. This aggregation in Contract-and-Sort is
performed by identifying sets of papers that dominate one another, ensuring that any set of papers is
necessarily ranked higher than any set which it dominates, and finally ranking the papers within each
set using any arbitrary aggregation algorithm (taken as an input B). Possible choices for the algorithm
B include the modified Borda count (Emerson, 2013), Plackett-Luce aggregation (Hajek et al., 2014), or
others (Caragiannis et al., 2017). Moving back to the main algorithm, the two rankings returned by Contract-
and-Sort respectively for the two components are simply interlaced to obtain a total ranking over all the
papers.
The following theorem now shows that Divide-and-Rank satisfies group unanimity and is strategyproof.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose the vertices of C can be partitioned into two groups pRC ,PCq and pR sC ,P sCq such
that there are no edges in C across the groups and that max
 |PC |
|RĎC | ,
|PĎC |
|RC |
(
ď µ
λ
. Then OptpΦGU, Cq “ 1, that
is, Divide-and-Rank is group unanimous and strategyproof.
Recall that OptpΦGUq is the optimal value of (1) under strategyproof and group unanimity. The assign-
ment (Algorithm 1) in Divide-and-Rank ensures strategyproofness while the aggregation (Algorithm 2) yields
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Algorithm 2 Divide-and-Rank aggregation
Input: profile pi “ pπp1qpP1q, . . . , πpmqpPmqq, groups pRC ,PCq, pR sC ,P sCq with |PC | ě |P sC |, aggregation
algorithm B
Output: total ranking of all papers
1: compute piC as the restriction of profile pi to only papers in PC , and piC¯ as the restriction of profile pi
to only papers in P sC
2: πC Ð Contract-and-SortppiC ,Bq
3: π sC Ð Contract-and-SortppiC¯ ,Bq
4: define I “
´Y
n
|PC |
]
,
Y
2n
|PC |
]
, ..., n
¯
5: return total ranking obtained by filling papers in PC into positions in I in order given by πC , and
papers in P sC into positions in rnszI in order given by π sC
6:
7: procedure Contract-and-Sort(profile rpi, aggregation algorithm B)
8: build a directed graph Grpi with the papers in rpi as its vertices and no edges
9: for each i P rm1s do
10: denoting πpiq “ ppi1 ą . . . ą piti ), add a directed edge from pij to pij`1 in Grpi, @j P rti ´ 1s
11: end for
12: for every ordered pair ppj1 , pj2q P EG rpi , replace multiple edges from pj1 to pj2 with a single edge
13: compute a topological ordering of the strongly connected components (SCCs) in Grpi
14: for every SCC in Grpi, compute a permutation of the papers in the component using algorithm B
15: return the permutation of all papers that is consistent with the topological ordering of the SCCs
and the permutations within the SCCs
16: end procedure
it the unanimity property.
The Divide-and-Rank algorithm aptly handles the various nuances of real-world conferences peer review,
which render other algorithms inapplicable. This includes the features that each reviewer can write multiple
papers and each paper can have multiple authors, and furthermore that each reviewer may review only a
subset of papers. Even under this challenging setting, our algorithm guarantees that no reviewer can influence
the ranking of her own paper via strategic behavior, and it is efficient from a social choice perspective.
In the remainder of this subsection, we delve a little deeper into the interleaving step (Step 5) of the
aggregation algorithm. At first glance, this interleaving – performed independent of the reviewers’ reports
– may be a cause of concern. Indeed, assuming there is some ground truth ranking of all papers and even
under the assumption that the outputs of the Contract-and-Sort procedure are consistent with this ranking,
the worst case scenario is where the interleaving causes papers to be placed at a positions that are Θpnq
away from their respective positions in the true ranking. We show that, however, such a worst case scenario
is unlikely to arise, when the ground truth ranking is independent of the conflict graph.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose C satisfies the conditions given in Theorem 4.1 and there exists constant c ě 2
such that maxt |P||PC | ,
|P|
|PĎC |u ď c. Assume the ground-truth ranking π˚ is chosen uniformly at random from all
permutations in ΠpPq independent of C, and that the two partial outputs of Contract-and-Sort in Algorithm 2
respect π˚. Let the output ranking of Divide-and-Rank be pπ. Then for every n ě 4c{ log 2, for any δ P p0, 1q,
with probability at least 1´ δ, we have:
max
1ďiďn
|π˚i ´ pπi| ď 2anc ¨ logp2n{δq.
Proposition 4.2 shows that the maximum deviation between the aggregated ranking and the ground truth
ranking is Op
a
n logpn{δqq with high probability. Hence for n large enough, such deviation is negligible when
program chairs of conferences need to make accept/reject decisions, where the number of accepted papers
usually scales linearly with n.
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4.2 Analysis of ICLR-17 submissions
Our Divide-and-Rank algorithm is based on the partitioning method which relies on a partition of the set of
authors and papers such that there is no conflict across the partition. The most prominent type of conflicts
is authorships, and here we restrict attention to the authorship conflict graph. In this section, we empirically
verify that the partitioning conditions indeed hold in a conference peer-review setting using data from the
ICLR-17 conference. We then empirically demonstrate how to make the partitioning method more appealing
for conference peer review. In particular, we show that removing only a small number of reviewers can result
in a dramatic reduction in the size of the largest component in the conflict graph thereby providing great
flexibility towards partitioning the papers and authors.
We analyzed all papers submitted to the ICLR-17 conference with the given authorship relationship
as the conflict g. ICLR-17 received 489 submissions by 1,417 authors; we believe this dataset is a good
representative of a medium-sized modern conference. In the analysis of this dataset, we instantiate the
conflict graph as the authorship graph. It is important to note that we consider only the set of authors as
the entire reviewer pool (since we do not have access to the actual reviewer identities). Adding reviewers
from outside the set of authors would only improve the results since these additional reviewers will have no
edges in the (authorship) conflict graph.
We first investigate the existence of (moderately sized) components in the conflict graph. Our analysis
shows that the authorship graph is not only disconnected, but also has more than 250 components. The
largest connected component contains 133 (that is, about 27%) of all papers, and the second largest CC
is much smaller. We tabulate the results from our analysis in Table 1. These statistics indeed verify our
assumption in Theorem 4.1 that the conflict graph is disconnected and can be divided into two disconnected
parts of similar size.
The partitioning method has previously been considered for the problem of peer grading (Kahng et al.,
2017). The peer grading setting is quite homogeneous in that each reviewer (student) goes through the same
course and hence any paper (homework) can be assigned to any reviewer. In peer review, however, different
reviewers typically have different areas of expertise and hence their abilities to review any paper varies by
the area of the paper. In order to accommodate this diversity in area of expertise in peer review, one must
have a greater flexibility in terms of assigning papers to reviewers. In our analysis in Table 1 we saw that the
largest connected component comprises 372 authors and 133 papers. It is reasonable to expect that a large
number of reviewers with expertise required to review these 133 papers would also fall in the same connected
component, meaning that a naïve application of Divide-and-Rank to this data would assign these 133 papers
to reviewers who may have a significantly lower expertise for these papers. This is indeed a concern, and in
what follows, we discuss a simple yet effective way to ameliorate this problem.
We show empirically using the ICLR-17 data that by removing only a small number of authors from the
reviewer pool, we can make the conflict graph much more sparse, allowing for a significantly more flexible
application of our algorithm Divide-and-Rank (or more generally, any partition-based algorithm). In more
detail, we remove a small fraction of authors from the reviewer pool. We use the simple heuristic of choosing
to remove the authors with the maximum degree in the (authorship) conflict graph. We then study the
statistics of the resulting conflict graph (with all papers but only the remaining reviewers) in terms of the
Table 1: Statistics of ICLR-17 submissions.
Description Number
Number of submitted papers 489
Number of distinct authors 1417
Average # papers written per author 1.27
Maximum # papers written by an author 14
Number of connected components 253
#authors, #papers in largest connected component 371, 133
#authors, #papers in second largest connected component 65, 20
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numbers and sizes of the connected components. We present the results in Table 2. We see that on removing
only a small fraction of authors – 50 authors which is only about 3.5% of all others – the number of papers in
the largest connected component reduces by 86% to just 18. Likewise, the number of authors in the largest
connected component reduces to as small as 55 from 371 originally. These numbers thus demonstrate that
despite all the idiosyncrasies of conference peer review, the Divide-and-Rank and the partitioning method can
be made practically applicable for peer review.
Table 2: Statistics of the conflict graph on removing a small number (ă 7%) of authors from the reviewer pool
comprising the 1,417 authors.
#Authors removed from reviewer pool
0 5 10 15 20 50 100
#Components 253 268 278 292 302 334 389
1st #Authors 371 313 304 228 205 55 28
1st #Papers 133 114 110 82 74 18 8
5 Negative Results
The positive results in the previous section focus on group unanimity, which is weaker than the conventional
notion of unanimity (which we refer to as pairwise unanimity). Moreover, the algorithm had a disconnected
review graph whereas the review graphs of (not strategyproof) conferences today are typically connected
(Shah et al., 2017). It is thus natural to wonder about the extent to which these results can be strengthened.
Can a peer-review system with a connected reviewer graph satisfy these properties? Can a strategyproof
peer-review system be pairwise unanimous? In this section we present some negative results toward these
questions, thereby highlighting the critical impediments towards (much) stronger results.
Before we go to our results, we give another notion of strategyproofness, which is significantly weaker
than the notion of strategyproofness (Definition 3.3), and is hence termed as weak strategyproofness. As
compared to strategyproofness which is defined with respect to a given conflict graph, weak strategyproofness
only requires the existence of a conflict graph (with non-zero reviewer-degrees) for which the review process
is strategyproof.
Definition 5.1 (Weak Strategyproofness, WSP). A review process pG, fq is called weakly strategyproof, if
for every reviewer ri, there exists some paper pj P P such that for every pair of distinct profiles (under
assignment G) pi “ pπp1q, . . . , πpi´1q, πpiq, πpi`1q, . . . , πpmqq and pi1 “ pπp1q, . . . , πpi´1q, πpiq
1
, πpi`1q, . . . , πpmqq,
it is guaranteed that fjppiq “ fjppi1q.
In other words, weak strategyproofness requires that for each reviewer there is at least one paper (not
necessarily authored by this reviewer) whose ranking cannot be influenced by the reviewer. As the name
suggests, strategyproofness is strictly stronger than weak strategyproofness, when each reviewer has at least
one paper of conflict.
We define the notion of weak strategyproofness mainly for theoretical purposes; obviously WSP is too
weak to be useful for practical applications. However we show that even this extremely weak requirement is
impossible to satisfy in situations of practical interest.
We summarize our results in Table 3. Recall that we show the property of group unanimity and strat-
egyproof for Divide-and-Rank; as the first direction of possible extension, we show in Theorem 5.1 that the
slightly stronger notion of pairwise unanimity is impossible to satisfy under mild assumptions, even without
strategyproof constraints. Then in Section 5.2 we explore the second direction of extension, by requiring a
connected G; we give conjectures and insights that group unanimity and weak strategyproofness is impossible
under this setting. At last in Theorem 5.4 we revert to the traditional setting of social choice, where every
reviewer gives a total ranking of the set of all papers P ; we show that in this setting it is impossible for any
review process to be pairwise unanimous and weakly strategyproof.
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Table 3: Summary of our negative results (first three rows of the table), and a comparison to our positve result
(fourth row).
Unanimity Strategyproof Requirement on G Possible? Reference
Pairwise None Mild (see Corollary 5.2) No Theorem 5.1
Group Weak Mild (Connected G) Conjecture: No Proposition 5.3
Pairwise Weak Complete G No Theorem 5.4
Group Yes None Yes Theorem 4.1
5.1 Impossibility of Pairwise Unanimity
We show in this section that pairwise unanimity is too strong to satisfy under mild assumptions. These
assumptions are mild in the sense that a violation of the assumptions leads to severely limited and somewhat
impractical choices of G.
In order to precisely state our result, we first introduce the notion of a review-relation graph H. Given a
paper-review assignment tPiumi“1, the review-relation graph H is an undirected graph with rns as its vertices
and where any two papers pj1 and pj2 are connected iff there exists at least one reviewer who reviews both
the papers. With this preliminary in place, we are now ready to state the main result of this section:
Theorem 5.1. There is no review process pG, fq that is pairwise unanimous (that is, ΦPUpG, fq “ 0 for
every G, f), when the following condition holds: H contains a cycle of length 3 or more such that no single
reviewer reviews all the papers in the cycle.
In the corollary below we give some direct implications of the condition in Theorem 5.1 when |P1| “
¨ ¨ ¨ “ |Pm| “ µ, that is, when every reviewer ranks a same number of papers.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose |P1| “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ |Pm| “ µ ě 2. If pG, fq is pairwise unanimous, the following conditions
hold:
(i) H does not contain any cycles of length µ` 1 or more.
(ii) The set of papers reviewed by any pair of reviewers ri1 and ri2 must satisfy the condition |Pi1 XPi2 | P
t0, 1, µu. In words, if a pair of reviewers review more than one papers in common then they must
review exactly the same set of papers.
(iii) The number of distinct sets in P1, . . . ,Pm is at most n´1µ´1 .
Remarks. In modern conferences like NIPS (Shah et al., 2017), each reviewer usually reviews around 3
to 6 papers. If we make the review process pairwise unanimous, by point (iii) of Corollary 5.2 the number
of distinct review sets is much smaller than the number of reviewers; this severely limits the design of review
sets, since many reviewers would be necessitated to review identical sets of papers. Point (ii) is a related,
strong requirement, since the specialization of reviewers might not allow for such limiting of the intersection
of review sets. For instance, there are a large number of pairs of reviewers who review more than one
common paper but none with exactly the same set of papers in NIPS 2016 (Shah et al., 2017). In general,
Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2 show that it is difficult to satisfy pairwise unanimity, even without considering
strategyproofness. This justifies our choice of group unanimity in the positive results.
5.2 Group Unanimity and Strategyproof for a Connected Review Graph
Having shown that pairwise unanimity is too strong a requirement to satisfy, we now consider another
direction for extension – conditions on the review graph G. A natural question follows: Under what condition
on the review graph G are both group unanimity and strategyproofness possible? Although we will leave the
question of finding the exact condition open, we conjecture that if we require G to be connected, then group
unanimity and strategyproofness cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
To show our insights, we analyze an extremely simplified review setting. We show that even in this very
simple case, ΦGUpG, fq “ 0 for every weakly strategyproof pG, fq.
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Proposition 5.3. Consider any n ě 4 and suppose P “ P1YP2YP3YP4, where P1, P2, P3, P4 are disjoint
nonempty sets of papers. Consider a review graph G with m “ 3 reviewers, where reviewer r1 reviews
tP1, P2u, r2 reviews tP2, P3u, and r3 reviews tP3, P4u. Then ΦGUpG, fq “ 0 for every f such that pG, fq is
weakly strategyproof.
Proposition 5.3 thus shows that for the simple review graph considered in the statement, group unanimity
and weak strategyproofness cannot hold at the same time. We conjecture that such a negative result may
hold for more general connected review graphs, and such a negative result may be proved by identifying a
component of the general review graph that meets the condition of Proposition 5.3. This shows that our
design process of the review graph in Section 4 is quite essential for ensuring those important properties.
5.3 Pairwise Unanimity and Strategyproof under Total Ranking
Throughout the paper so far, motivated by the application of conference peer review, we considered a setting
where every reviewer reviews a (small) subset of the papers. In contrast, a bulk of the classical literature
in social choice theory considers a setting where each reviewer ranks all candidates or papers (Arrow, 1950;
Satterthwaite, 1975). Given this long line of literature, intellectual curiosity drives us to study the case of
all reviewers reviewing all papers for our conference peer-review setting.
We now consider our notion of pairwise unanimous and weakly strategyproof in this section under this
total-ranking setting, where P1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ Pm “ P . In this case, the review graph G is always a complete
bipartite graph, and it only remains to design the aggregation function f . Although total rankings might
not be practical for large-scale conferences, it is still helpful for smaller-sized conferences and workshops.
Under this total ranking setting, we prove a negative result showing that pairwise unanimity and strat-
egyproofness cannot be satisfied together, and furthermore, even the notion of weak strategyproofness (to-
gether with PU) is impossible to achieve.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose n ě 2. If P1 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ Pm “ P , then Opt
PUpΦ, Cq “ 0 for any weakly strategyproof
pG, fq.
To prove Theorem 5.4, we use Cantor’s diagonalization argument to generate a contradiction by assuming
there exists f that is both PU and WSP. (Note that the conditions required for Theorem 5.1 are not met in
the total ranking case.)
It is interesting to note that pairwise unanimity can be easily satisfied in this setting of total rankings, by
using a simple aggregation scheme such as the Borda count. However, Theorem 5.4 shows that surprisingly,
even under the extremely mild notion of strategyproofness given by WSP, it is impossible to achieve pairwise
unanimity and strategyproofness simultaneously.
6 Proofs
In this section, we provide the proofs of all the results from previous sections.
6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose pG, fq is PU, and P 1 Ă P satisfies that every reviewer ranks the papers she reviewed from P 1 higher
than those she reviewed from PzP 1. Now for every px P P 1 and py P PzP 1 and reviewer ri such that ri
reviews both px and py, ri must rank px ą py since otherwise the assumption of P 1 is violated. Since f is
PU, we know that fppiq must respect px ą py as well. This argument holds for every px P P 1 and py P PzP 1
that have been reviewed by at least one reviewer, and hence pG, fq is also GU.
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6.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We assume that the condition on the partitioning of the conflict graph, as stated in the statement of this
theorem, is met. We begin with a lemma which shows that for any aggregation algorithm B, Contract-and-
Sort is group unanimous.
Lemma 6.1. For any assignment and aggregation algorithms A and B, the aggregation procedure Contract-
and-Sort is group unanimous.
We prove this lemma in Section 6.2.1. Under the assumptions on µ, λ and sizes of RC ,R sC ,PC ,P sC , it
is easy to verify that there is a paper allocation satisfies |Pi| ď µ,@ i P rms and each paper gets at least
λ reviews. The strategyproofness of Divide-and-Rank follows from the standard ideas in the past literature
on partitioning-based methods (Alon et al., 2011): Algorithm 1 guarantees that reviewers in RC do not
review papers in P sC , and reviewers in R sC do not review papers in PC . Hence the fact that Divide-and-Rank
is strategyproof trivially follows from the assignment procedure where each reviewer does not review the
papers that are in conflict with her, as specified by the conflict graph C. Given that all the other reviews
are fixed, the ranking of the papers in conflict with her will only be determined by the other group of
reviewers and so fixed no matter how she changes her own ranking. On the other hand, from Lemma 6.1,
since Contract-and-Sort is group unanimous, we know that πC and π sC respect group unanimity w.r.t. piC
and piC¯ , respectively. Since pi “ ppiC ,piC¯q, it follows that πC and π sC also respect group unanimity w.r.t. pi.
Finally, note that there is no reviewer who has reviewed both papers from PC and P sC , the interlacing step
preserves the group unanimity, which completes our proof.
6.2.1 Proof of Lemma 6.1
Let fprpiq :“ Contract-and-Sortprpi,Bq, where rpi is a preference profile. Define π “ fprpiq. Let k denote the
number of SCCs in Grpi. Construct a directed graph rGrpi such that each of its vertices represents a SCC in
Grpi, and there is an edge from one vertex to another in rGrpi iff there exists an edge going from one SCC to
the other in the original graph Grpi. Let v˜1, . . . , v˜k be a topological ordering of the vertices in rGrpi. Since
v˜1, . . . , v˜k is a topological ordering, then edges can only go from v˜j1 to v˜j2 where j1 ă j2. Now consider
any cut pPX ,PY q in Grpi that satisfies the requirement of group unanimity, i.e., all edges in the cut direct
from PX to PY . Then there is no pair of papers px P PX and py P PY such that px and py are in the
same connected component, otherwise there will be both paths from px to py and py to px, contradicting
that pPX ,PY q forms a cut where all the edges go in one direction. This shows that PX and PY also form
a partition of all the vertices v˜1, . . . , v˜k. Now consider any edge ppx, pyq from PX to PY . Suppose px is in
component v˜jx and py in component v˜jy . We have jx ‰ jy, since PX and PY forms a partition of all SCCs;
also it cannot happen that jx ą jy, otherwise v˜1, . . . , v˜k is not a topological ordering returned by f . So it
must be jx ă jy, and the edge ppx, pyq is respected in the final ordering.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
We would first need a lemma for the location of papers:
Lemma 6.2. Let I1 “
!Y
n
|PC |
]
,
Y
2n
|PC |
]
, ..., n
)
, I2 “
!
g
´
n
|PĎC |
¯
, g
´
2n
|PĎC |
¯
, ..., n´ 1
)
, where gpxq “ rxs´ 1 is
the largest integer that is strictly smaller than x. Then I1 X I2 “ H and I1 Y I2 “ rns.
We prove this lemma in Section 6.3.1.
Consider any paper pi, and suppose its position in π˚ is ℓ. Define n1 “ |PC | and n2 “ |PC¯ |. Without loss
of generality assume n1 ě n2 (the other case is symmetric) and let n ě 4c{ log 2. We discuss the following
two cases depending on whether pi P PC or pi P PC¯ .
Case I: If pi P PC . Let k be the number of papers in PC ranked strictly higher (better) than ℓ according
to π˚. Since the permutation π˚ is uniformly random, conditioned on this value of ℓ, the other papers’
positions in the true ranking are uniformly at random in positions rnsztℓu. Now for any paper pj , j ‰ i,
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let Xj be an indicator random variable set as 1 if position of pj is higher than ℓ in π˚, and 0 otherwise.
So k “
ř
pjPPCztpiu
Xj , and PrpXj “ 1q “ ℓ´1n´1 when j ‰ i. Then using Hoeffding’s inequality without
replacement, we have
Pr
ˆˇˇˇˇ
k
n1 ´ 1
´
ℓ´ 1
n´ 1
ˇˇˇˇ
ě ε
˙
ď 2 expp´2pn1 ´ 1qε
2q ď 2 expp´n1ε
2q
for any ε ą 0. The last inequality is due to n1 ě 2, which holds because n{n1 ď c with a constant c. Now
setting ε “
b
logp2{δq
n1
we have the bound
Pr
˜ˇˇˇˇ
k
n1 ´ 1
´
ℓ´ 1
n´ 1
ˇˇˇˇ
ď
d
logp2{δq
n1
¸
ě 1´ δ.
Now note that by Algorithm 2, the position of paper pi in the ranking pπ is pπi “ Ypk ` 1q ¨ nn1 ]. Use this
relationship to substitute k in the above inequality, and notice that by assumption maxtn{n1, n{n2u ď c, we
have
pk ` 1q ¨
n
n1
ď
ˆ
pn1 ´ 1q
ˆ
ε`
ℓ´ 1
n´ 1
˙
` 1
˙
n
n1
“
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨
n
n´ 1
pℓ´ 1q `
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨ nε`
n
n1
ď
n
n1
` nε` ℓ´ 1.
On the other hand,
pk ` 1q ¨
n
n1
ě
ˆ
pn1 ´ 1q
ˆ
ℓ´ 1
n´ 1
´ ε
˙
` 1
˙
n
n1
“
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨
n
n´ 1
pℓ´ 1q ´
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨ nε`
n
n1
ě
n
n1
´ nε`
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨
n
n´ 1
pℓ´ 1q.
So
pk ` 1q ¨
n
n1
´ ℓ ě
n
n1
´ nε`
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨
n
n´ 1
pℓ´ 1q ´ ℓ (2)
ě
n
n1
´ nε`
n1 ´ 1
n1
¨
n
n´ 1
pn´ 1q ´ n (3)
ě ´nε.
Here (3) is because n1´1
n1
¨ n
n´1 ă 1, and thus RHS of (2) is minimized (as a function of ℓ) when ℓ “ n.
Combining the two inequalities above we have
|pπi ´ ℓ| ď nε` n
n1
“ n
d
logp2{δq
n1
`
n
n1
ď 2
a
nc ¨ logp2{δq,
where the last inequality is by the assumption that n is large enough so that 2c ď
a
nc ¨ logp2{δq.
Case II: If pi P PC¯ . Again, let k be the number of papers in PC¯ ranked strictly higher (better) than ℓ
according to π˚. As the analysis in Case I, similarly, we have k “
ř
pjPPC¯ztpiu
Xj, and PrpXj “ 1q “ ℓ´1n´1 .
With the same analysis using Hoeffding’s inequality without replacement, with probability at least 1´ δ we
have ˇˇˇˇ
k
n2 ´ 1
´
ℓ´ 1
n´ 1
ˇˇˇˇ
ď
d
logp2{δq
n2
.
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Now using Lemma 6.2, the position of paper pi in pπ in this case is pπi “ g ´pk ` 1q ¨ nn2¯. Using exactly the
same analysis as Case I we have
´nε ď pk ` 1q ¨
n
n2
´ ℓ ď
n
n2
` nε´ 1,
and thus
|pπi ´ ℓ| ď nε` n
n2
“ n
d
logp2{δq
n2
`
n
n2
ď 2
a
nc ¨ logp2{δq.
Combine both Case I and Case II, and notice that π˚i is uniformly distributed in rns. Using a union
bound over i “ 1, 2, ..., n, with probability 1´ δ we have:
max
1ďiďn
|pπi ´ π˚i | ď 2anc ¨ logp2n{δq.
6.3.1 Proof of Lemma 6.2
We show that for every slot q that there is no p such that
Y
p ¨ n
n1
]
“ q, there exists one slot p1 for P sC such
that g
´
p1 ¨ n
n2
¯
“ q, i.e., all slots that are left empty by PC are taken by slots of P sC . Since that the two
kinds of slots have a total number of n, we show that there are no overlap between the two kinds of slots,
thus proving the lemma.
Let t “ n{n1. Suppose if there is no p such that
Y
p ¨ n
n1
]
“ q, then there must exist some pˆ such that
q ` 1 ď pˆt ă q ` t. (4)
This is because there must be a multiple of t in the range rq, q ` tq, but our assumption makes that there is
no such multiply in rq, q ` 1q.
Now let u “ n{n2. By n1 ` n2 “ n we have 1{u` 1{t “ 1; substituting t “ u{pu´ 1q in (4) we have
q ă pq ´ pˆ` 1qu ď q ` 1.
Thus there exists p1 “ gppq ´ pˆ` 1quq P P sC . Thus we prove the lemma.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 5.1
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is a direct formulation of our intuition in Section 5.1. Without loss of generality
let pp1, . . . , plq be the cycle not reviewed by a single reviewer, for l ě 3. Hence there exists a partial profile
pi such that for all the reviewers who have reviewed both pj and pj`1, pj ą pj`1,@j P rls (define pl`1 “ p1).
On the other hand, since for each reviewer, at least one pair ppj , pj`1q is not reviewed by her, the constructed
partial profile is valid. Now assume f is PU, then we must have p1 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą pl and pl ą p1, which contradicts
the transitivity of the ranking.
6.5 Proof of Corollary 5.2
We prove each of the conditions in order.
Proof of part (i): If there is a cycle of size µ ` 1, then no reviewer can review all the papers in it since it
exceeds the size of review sets. So there is no such cycle.
Proof of part (ii): The statement trivially holds for µ “ 2. For µ ě 3, Suppose there are two reviewers
ri1 and ri2 such that 2 ď |Pi1 X Pi2 | ď µ ´ 1. Since Pi1 ‰ Pi2 , there exist papers pj1 and pj2 such that
pj1 P Pi1zPi2 and pj2 P Pi2zPi1 . Also |Pi1 X Pi2 | ě 2, and let pj3 , pj4 P Pi1 X Pi2 . By definition it is easy
15
to verify that ppj1 , pj3 , pj2 , pj4q forms a cycle that satisfies the condition in Theorem 5.1, and hence pG, fq is
not pairwise unanimous.
Proof of part (iii): Define a “paper-relation graph” Gp as follows: Given a paper-review assignment tPiumi“1,
the paper-relation graph Gp is an undirected graph, whose nodes are the distinct sets in tPiumi“1; we connect
two review sets iff they have one paper in common. Note that by (ii), each pair of distinct sets has at most
one paper in common.
We first show that pG, fq is pairwise unanimous, then Gp must necessarily be a forest. If there is a cycle
in Gp, then there is a corresponding cycle in the review relation graph H. To see this, not losing generality
suppose the shortest cycle in Gp is pP1, ...,Plq. Also, suppose P1XP2 “ tp1u,P2XP3 “ tp2u, ...,PlXP1 “ tplu
not losing generality. Then pp1, ..., plq forms a cycle in Gp by its definition. Since each reviewer reviews exactly
one set in Gp, there is no reviewer reviewing all papers in this cycle of papers in Gp. Thus the condition in
Theorem 5.1 is satisfied, and pG, fq is not pairwise unanimous.
We now use this result to complete our proof. Consider the union of all sets of papers that form vertices
of Gp. We know that this union contains exactly n papers since each paper is reviewed at least once. Now let
kp denote the number of distinct review sets (that is, number of vertices of Gp), and let Pii , ...,Pikp denote
the vertices of Gp. The union of three or more sets in tPiku
kp
k“1 is empty, since otherwise there will be a cycle
in Gp. Using this fact, we apply the inclusion-exclusion principle to obtain
n “
kpÿ
k“1
|Pik | ´
ÿ
1ďk1ăk2ďkp
|Pik1 X Pik2 | “ kpµ´ |EGp |.
Now use the inequality |EGp | ď kp´1 which arises since Gp is a forest, to obtain the claimed bound kp ď
n´1
µ´1 .
6.6 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Fix some ranking of papers within each individual set P1, P2, P3 and P4 (e.g., according to the natural
order of their indices). In the remainder of the proof, any ranking of all papers always considers these fixed
rankings within these individual sets. With this in place, in what follows, we refer to any ranking in terms
of the rankings of the four sets of papers.
Suppose there is one such f that satisfies group unanimity and weak strategyproofness for G, and consider
the following 4 profiles:
(1) r1 : P1 ą P2, r2 : P2 ą P3, r3 : P3 ą P4 (2) r1 : P2 ą P1, r2 : P3 ą P2, r3 : P4 ą P3
(3) r1 : P2 ą P1, r2 : P2 ą P3, r3 : P3 ą P4 (4) r1 : P2 ą P1, r2 : P3 ą P2, r3 : P3 ą P4
By the property of GU, profile (1) leads to output P1 ą P2 ą P3 ą P4, whereas (2) leads to output
P4 ą P3 ą P2 ą P1. Now compare (1) and (3): The output of (3) must have P2 at the top and satisfy
P3 ą P4, by the property of GU. So the output of profile (3) must be one of i) P2 ą P1 ą P3 ą P4, ii)
P2 ą P3 ą P1 ą P4, or iii) P2 ą P3 ą P4 ą P1. Now note that only reviewer r1 changes ranking across
profiles (1) and (3), and hence by WSP the position of at least one paper in the output of profile (3) must
be the same as in that of profile (1). This makes iii) infeasible, so the output of (3) must be either i) or ii).
Similarly, the output of (4) is either P3 ą P4 ą P2 ą P1 or P3 ą P2 ą P4 ą P1. Now comparing (3) and (4):
only r2 changes ranking, but none of the four papers can be at the same position no matter how we choose
the outputs of (3) and (4). This yields a contradiction.
6.7 Proof of Theorem 5.4
We begin with a definition of an “influence graph” Gf induced by any given aggregation rule f .
Definition 6.1 (Influence graph). For any review aggregation rule f , the influence graph Gf induced by f
is a bipartite graph with two groups of vertices R and P , and edges as follows. A vertex ri is connected to
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vertex pj iff there exists a certain profile pi such that ri is able to change the output ranking of pj by changing
her own preference. Formally, there exists an edge between any pair pri, pjq P EGf iff there exist profiles
pi “ tπp1q, . . . , πpi´1q, πpiq, πpi`1q, . . . , πpmqu and pi1 “ tπp1q, . . . , πpi´1q, π˜piq, πpi`1q, . . . , πpmqu and j P rns such
that fppiqpjq ‰ fppi1qpjq.
From this definition, it is thus not hard to see that f is WSP if and only if the degree of every reviewer
node in Gf is strictly smaller than n.
We prove the claim via a contradiction argument. Assume that f is both PU and WSP. Let Gf be the
corresponding influence graph. Firstly we show that degppq ą 0 for every paper p, where the degree is for
the influence graph Gf . Suppose otherwise that degppjq “ 0 for some paper pj. This means no reviewer
can affect the ranking of pj; in other words, the position of paper pj is fixed regardless of the profile. This
contradicts with our assumption of pairwise unanimity; to see this, pick another paper pj1 where j1 ‰ j (this
is possible since n ě 2). Not losing generality suppose j ă j1. Consider a profile pi where every reviewer
ranks pj ą pj1 ą P´pj,j1q, and another profile pi1 where everyone ranks pj‘ ą pj ą P´pj,j1q; here P´pj,j1q means
the ordinal ranking of papers other than pj , pj1 , i.e., p1 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą pj´1 ą pj`1 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą pj1´1 ą pj1`1 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą pn.
By the property of PU, when everyone ranks the same the final result must be the same as everyone; however
this means the position of pj is different in the two profiles, and thus the position of pj is not fixed. This
makes contradiction and we prove that degppq ą 0 for every paper p.
Now for any reviewer ri P R, let epriq P P be the paper with the lowest index in P such that pri, epriqq R
EGf . Since f is WSP, epriq must exist for all i P rms. Define the set of such papers as P
1 :“ te1, . . . , em1u “
tepriq : ri P Ru. Note that we must have m1 ď m and in fact m1 can be strictly smaller than m because of
the possible overlap between epriq,@i P rms. From the definition of m1 and property of WSP, it is clear that
m1 ě 1. If m1 “ 1, we have pri, e1q R EGf for every reviewer ri; this contradicts with the fact that degppq ě 0
for every paper p. So m1 ą 1.
In this proof, we slightly overload the notation of fekppiq to mean the position of paper ek in fppiq. Based
on the inverse mapping from P 1 to R, we partition all the reviewers R into m1 groups tR11, . . . ,R
1
m1u such
that all reviewers in any set R1k contributed paper ek when defining set P
1. In particular, we have that no
reviewer in R1j is connected to paper ej in the influence graph Gf .
In the description that follows, we restrict attention to the papers in P 1, and assume that in any ranking
all remaining pn´ n1q papers are positioned at the end of the preference list of any reviewer. Now consider
the following two preferences over P 1:
π “ e1 ą e2 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1 , π
1 “ e2 ą e3 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1 ą e1.
Using π and π1, define the following m1 ` 1 different profiles:
pi0 “ pπ, . . . , πq, pik “ pπ
1, . . . , π1loooomoooon
k
, π, . . . , πlooomooon
m1´k
q @k P rm1s.
where in pik the first k preferences are π1 and the last (m1´k) preferences are π. In what follows, we will use
a diagonalization argument to generate a contradiction using the condition that f is WSP. We first present
a lemma, which we prove in Section 6.7.1.
Lemma 6.3. If f is pairwise unanimous and weakly strategyproof, fekppikq “ k for every k P rm
1s, that is,
under profile pik, the k-th position in the output ranking must be taken by paper ek.
Applying Lemma 6.3 with k “ m1, we obtain that fem1 ppim1q “ m
1. However, on the other side, since
pim1 “ pπ
1, . . . , π1q and π1 “ e2 ą e3 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1 ą e1, again by the PU property we have fem1 ppim1q “ 1.
This leads to a contradiction, hence f cannot be both WSP and PU.
6.7.1 Proof of Lemma 6.3
We prove by induction on k.
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Base case. Since f is PU, the output ranking fppi0q must be:
fppi0q “ e1 ą e2 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1
Consider k “ 1. Note that π and π1 differ only at the position of e1, and in pi1, only P 11 changes their
preference and all the other preferences are kept fixed. Then by the WSP of f , the output ranking of e1 will
not be changed because P 11 are not connected to e1 in the influence graph, so we must have:
fppi1q “ e1 ą e2 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1 ,
Induction step. Suppose the claim of this lemma holds for t1, . . . , ku. Consider the case of k ` 1.
Observe that fppikqpekq “ k, and in both π and π1 we have:
ek ą ek`1 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1 .
Then since f is PU, we know that the last m1 ´ k ` 1 positions in the output ranking of fppikq must be
given by ek ą ek`1 ą ¨ ¨ ¨ ą em1 , i.e., fek`1ppikq “ k ` 1. The profiles pik and pik`1 differ only in the
preference given by P 1k`1, and no reviewer in set P
1
k`1 can influence the position of paper ek`1. It follows
that fek`1ppik`1q “ k ` 1, which completes our proof.
7 Discussion
In this paper we address the important problem of designing strategyproof and efficient peer-review mecha-
nism. The setting of peer review is challenging due to the various idiosyncrasies of the peer-review process:
reviewers review only a subset of papers, each paper has multiple authors who may be reviewers, and each
reviewer may author multiple submissions. We design an algorithm that is indeed strategyproof and satisfies
group unanimity, and show that in contrast, it is impossible for any algorithm to remain strategyproof and
satisfy the stronger notion of pairwise unanimity.
The framework established here leads to a number of useful open problems:
• Consider the following weaker notion of strategyproofness defined for authorship conflicts: No author
should be able to improve the rank of her/his own paper. Can this weaker notion of strategyproofness
allow for more efficiency?
• Can recruitment of a small number of reviewers with no conflicts (e.g., in case of authorship conflicts,
reviewers who have not submitted any papers) lead to significant improvements in efficiency? Can
better ways to eliminate some authors from the reviewer pool increase applicability of partition-based
algorithms?
• The results in this paper considered the social choice property of unanimity as a measure of efficiency.
While this can be regarded as a first-order notion of efficiency, it is of interest to consider complex
notions of efficiency. One useful notion is a statistical notion, in which case the function Φ would
represent the statistical utility of estimation (Stelmakh et al., 2018) of the (partial or full) ranking of
papers under a statistical model for reviewer reports. An alternative notion of efficiency combines an
assignment quality based on the similarities of assigned reviewers and papers with group unanimity, or
formally, as ΦpG, fq “ p
ř
ijrGsijSijq ¨ Φ
GUpG, fq, where Sij denotes the similarity between reviewer i
and paper j.
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